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 I. INTRODUCTION 
 THE DECISION OF the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in its 2004 Advisory Opinion on  Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory 1 ( ‘ the  Wall ’ ) is the only authoritative 
 judicial statement on many of the controversial questions of law that characterise 
the confl ict between Israel and Palestine over the former mandate territory of 
 Palestine. While the Opinion focuses on the legality of the wall, barrier, or fence that 
Israel is building on Palestinian territory, it also pronounces on a wide range of ques-
tions of international humanitarian law and human rights law that give it a general 
importance. Its unanimous fi ndings on the illegality of settlements and the applica-
tion of the Fourth Geneva Convention and multilateral human rights conventions 
in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (OPT) are particularly signifi cant. Although 
the Opinion of the Court was unanimous on many of the key issues it has failed to 
win the same measure of support from the international community of states as the 
Advisory Opinion of the ICJ in  Legal Consequences for States of the Continued 
Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) , 2 which also dealt with 
legal questions arising from a disputed mandate territory of the League of Nations. 
Hopes that, like the latter Opinion, the  Wall would guide the political organs 
of the United Nations in their search for a just and peaceful resolution of the 
Israel – Palestine confl ict have not been realised. Nevertheless, it constitutes a signifi -
cant statement of the law and provides a normative framework for the settlement 
of the confl ict between Israel and Palestine. Moreover, it has inspired civil society to 
take concerted action to enforce international law. It is a landmark decision and one 
that may yet chart the course of events in the Middle East. 
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 II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
 The confl ict between Israel and Palestine in the former mandate territory of Palestine 
is characterised by legal disputation. The United Kingdom had been entrusted with 
the mandate over Palestine by the League of Nations. After it made it clear that 
it was unable to determine the future of the territory, the General Assembly 
of the United Nations, as successor to the League of Nations, recommended in 
Resolution 181(II) that Palestine be partitioned into a Jewish state and an Arab 
state, with Jerusalem as an international city under UN administration. Whether the 
General Assembly enjoyed the legal competence to make such a recommendation 
was disputed then and is still disputed. 3 A proposal that the question be referred 
to the ICJ for an advisory opinion was narrowly defeated. 4 Subsequent political 
developments involving disputed questions of law have not been referred to the ICJ. 
These include the unilateral declaration of the State of Israel in 1948; the Armistice 
Agreements of 1949 that brought the hostilities between Arab states and Israel to 
an end after this declaration of independence; General Assembly Resolution 194(III) 
of 1948 on the subject of Palestinian refugees; the question whether Israel acted 
defensively or aggressively in the Six-Day War of 1967; the exact meaning of  Security 
Council Resolution 242 calling for the withdrawal of Israel from the  territories it 
had occupied; the annexation of East Jerusalem in 1980 condemned as invalid by 
the Security Council; 5 the legality of settlements in the OPT; and the Oslo Accords 
of 1993. In 2002, Israel commenced building a wall mainly in Palestinian  territory, 
ostensibly to protect Israelis from suicide bombers entering the territory in the course 
of the Second Intifada. It was only subsequently, in 2003, that the General Assembly, 
frustrated by Israel ’ s apparent disregard for international law, decided to request an 
advisory opinion on a disputed question of law. 6 In order to understand the histori-
cal and legal context in which the decision to build the wall was taken it is necessary 
briefl y to outline the history of Israeli – Palestinian relations. 7 
 From 1949 to 1967 the mandate territory of Palestine was divided between Israel, 
Jordan and Egypt. Jordan was the occupying power of East Jerusalem and the West 
Bank, while Egypt occupied Gaza. In 1967, following the Six-Day War, Israel occu-
pied the Palestinian territories of East Jerusalem, West Bank and Gaza. Although 
it purported to annex East Jerusalem in 1980 it made no attempt to annex the 
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West Bank and Gaza, which it administered as occupying power. Despite the prohi-
bition of the transfer of parts of its own civilian population into the occupied terri-
tories contained in Article 49(6) of the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949, to which 
it is a party, Israel proceeded to establish Jewish settlements in the OPT. 
 Israel ’ s repressive occupation and its expansion of settlements resulted in the 
First Intifada of 1987 – 88. This spontaneous uprising, mainly on the part of young 
 Palestinians, took the form of civil disobedience, demonstrations, and stone-throwing. 
The Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) responded with force. Some 1200 Palestinians and 
200 Israelis were killed. This uprising prompted a revival of the peace process and the 
United States and the Soviet Union co-sponsored peace talks in Madrid and 
 Washington. These negotiations failed, but in 1993 the Palestine Liberation Organi-
zation (PLO) and Israel met secretly in Oslo to reach agreement on the Oslo Accords, 
in which the PLO recognised Israel and Israel agreed to the establishment of 
Palestinian self-government over the West Bank and Gaza. This interim arrangement 
would continue for fi ve years and lead to a fi nal status agreement. 8 
 Both Israel and Palestine were dissatisfi ed with the Oslo regime. Israel complained 
repeatedly that the Palestinian Authority under Yasser Arafat failed to prevent acts 
of violence committed by Islamic Jihad and Hamas (which had been formed dur-
ing the First Intifada). The Palestinians were aggrieved to fi nd that the construction 
of settlements continued unabated and found the checkpoints that regulated their 
movements humiliating and harmful to the economy. Moreover, agreements reached 
with Israel under Oslo in respect of a permanent settlement, the economy, the trans-
fer of territory, and prisoner release were not honoured. 
 In the fi nal months of the Clinton administration in 2000 serious attempts were 
made to implement a fi nal status agreement. President Clinton called a meeting 
at Camp David in July 2000 in which he, Chairman Arafat, and Prime Minister 
Barak participated. But the talks broke down, mainly on the issue of sovereignty 
over Haram al-Sharif, which accommodates the al-Aqsa Mosque, Islam ’ s third most 
sacred site, and the Dome of the Rock. This site is also of special signifi cance to 
Jews as it is claimed to be the place on which the Jewish Second Temple stood. For 
Jews it is known as the Temple Mount. Neither side was prepared to compromise 
on this issue. 
 Negotiations between the Israelis, Palestinians and Americans continued at 
Taba in January 2001 after the failure of Camp David as all parties were aware of 
 President Clinton ’ s determination to secure a peaceful settlement in the last months 
of his presidency. 9 Parties came close to reaching an agreement but time ran out. 
President Clinton ’ s term of offi ce had come to an end and Israel faced an election in 
early  February. On 6 February 2001 the Likud Party under Ariel Sharon defeated the 
Labour Party under Ehud Barak. Sharon announced that high-level talks between 
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the Israelis and Palestinians would be discontinued. In the meantime the Second 
Intifada had started. 
 On 28 September 2000 Ariel Sharon, leader of the Likud Party, accompanied by 
a large party of Likud supporters, visited the Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount. The 
ostensible purpose of the visit was to assert the right of Israelis to visit the Temple 
Mount, but it was generally believed that the main purpose was to show that under 
a Likud government the Temple Mount would remain under Israeli sovereignty. 
Reluctantly the Barak Government gave permission to Sharon ’ s visit to dispel any 
suggestion that it was prepared to compromise Israeli sovereignty over the Temple 
Mount. Fearing that the visit would raise tensions among the Palestinians, Arafat 
and other Palestinian leaders called on Sharon not to go. 
 As predicted, the visit was followed by protests and demonstrations in the Old 
City of Jerusalem, in which seven Palestinians were killed and some 300 wounded. 
Spontaneous demonstrations erupted all over the West Bank and Gaza prompted by 
disillusionment over the Oslo Accords, the brutality and humiliation of the occu-
pation, poverty and the miserable conditions in the refugee camps. Protests and 
demonstrations were soon accompanied by stone-throwing and lethal force. The 
response of Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) was to use tear gas, rubber bullets and live 
fi re in a display of excessive force. 
 Whereas the First Intifada remained a popular uprising characterised by demon-
strations, stone-throwing and acts of civil disobedience, the Second Intifada became 
a low-level civil war. Both sides employed armed force of different kinds resulting 
in thousands of deaths and injuries. 10 On the Palestinian side, suicide bombings 
resulting in the deaths of many innocent Israelis, stone-throwing, armed force and 
rocket fi re from Gaza joined protests and peaceful demonstrations as features of the 
uprising. Over 1,000 Israelis were killed. The IDF, supported by settlers, responded 
aggressively. Ground forces confronted mass protests and demonstrations with live 
fi re supported by F16 fi ghter aircraft and Apache gunship helicopters. Helicopters 
were used for targeted assassinations of militants with little regard for  ‘ collateral 
damage ’ to civilians near to the selected militant. The Israeli human rights non-
governmental organisation B ’ Tselem estimated that from 2000 to April 2008, when 
the Second Itifada came to an end, some 4,475 Palestinians were killed, of whom 
most were civilians. Thousands of Palestinians were arrested, detained and tortured. 
Over 4,000 houses were demolished, agricultural land was stripped of trees and 
crops, free movement was seriously restricted by checkpoints and curfews, the coast 
of Gaza was blockaded, and hospitals and schools were attacked. 
 Suicide bombers that struck in the cities of Israel, killing and wounding hundreds 
of Israelis, had a devastating impact on Israeli society. 11 Ostensibly in response to 
these bombings, Israel commenced construction of the wall. 
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 III. THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE WALL 
 In 2002 Israel began construction of a wall or barrier to separate the West Bank 
from Israel. 12 When fi nished it will run for about 700 kilometres. In places, particu-
larly in urban areas, the wall takes the form of an eight-metre-high concrete wall. 
However, most of the structure is a barrier some 60 – 100 metres wide comprising 
three fences, of which the outer two are protected by coils of barbed wire while the 
inner fence has electronic equipment which allows intruders to be detected. There 
are patrol roads on either side of the outer fence and a trace road, which is a strip of 
sand that allows footprints to be detected. Sometimes the barrier includes trenches. 
There are fortifi ed guard towers at regular intervals. Israel describes the structure 
as a  ‘ fence ’ while the UN Secretary-General preferred to use the term  ‘ barrier ’ . 
Within Palestine it is known as the wall, or more frequently the  ‘ Apartheid wall ’ . 
In its Advisory Opinion on the  Wall the ICJ preferred to describe it as a  ‘ wall ’ to 
conform with the terminology employed by the General Assembly. 13 I shall follow 
this terminology. 
 The declared object of the wall was to prevent suicide bombers from entering 
Israel, but the fact that the wall did not follow the Green Line — the Armistice Line of 
1949 — and instead entered the West Bank and encircled Israeli settlements, made it 
clear that the wall was intended to serve another purpose as well, namely the incor-
poration of settlements into Israel itself. It was, arguably, a pretext for annexation of 
Palestinian territory under the guise of security. 
 When the construction of the wall began I was serving as Special Rapporteur on 
the Human Rights Situation in the Occupied Palestinian Territories to the United 
Nations Commission on Human Rights (replaced in 2006 by the Human Rights 
Council). In this capacity I was required to visit the OPT twice a year and to report 
to the Commission itself and to the Third Committee of the General Assembly. 
I followed the construction of the wall from the very beginning. 
 In 2002 I was taken to see paint marks or rocks on hills near Qalqiliya and Tulkarm 
which had been made by Israel to indicate the course of the wall. In June 2003, 14 
some 150 kilometres had been completed. At that stage it intruded six to seven 
kilometres into Palestine, but today it extends over 20 kilometres into  Palestinian 
territory. Most of the wall is built in Palestinian territory, on the Palestinian side of 
the Green Line, the internationally recognised border between Israel and  Palestine. 
It seizes over 10 per cent of Palestinian land, including some of its most fertile agri-
cultural land and water resources. The wall incorporates most of Israel ’ s settle-
ments in the West Bank, with over 80 per cent of the settler population. It includes 
42 Palestinian villages with a population of some 56,000 into the  ‘ seam zone ’ or 
 ‘ closed area ’ , that is, the area between the wall and the Green Line. In some places 
it completely encircles Palestinian villages, separating them from the West Bank and 
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converting them into isolated enclaves. Qalqiliya, a city with a population of over 
40,000, is completely surrounded by the concrete wall and residents are allowed to 
leave only through checkpoints. 
 Those living on the West Bank side of the wall require permits to access their own 
agricultural land on the other side of the wall in the  ‘ seam zone ’ . Permits for farmers 
are not readily granted; the process of application is humiliating; gates are few and 
often do not open as scheduled; and those passing through the gates are subject to 
harassment and abuse. 
 Jerusalem has been radically affected by the wall. Many villages or suburbs 
 previously within the Governate of Jerusalem are placed on the West Bank side of 
the wall, which means that Palestinians living in these villages can only access their 
schools, hospitals, universities and holy places through checkpoints. In some places 
the wall runs through Palestinian communities, separating neighbours and families. 
It is diffi cult to understand what security purpose could possibly be served by build-
ing a wall through a Palestinian community. 
 In 2003 I sought to draw public attention to the wall. In August, I wrote an op-ed 
for the  International Herald Tribune 15 which stated that the wall was  ‘ manifestly 
intended to create facts on the ground ’ and that it constituted an act of annexa-
tion.  ‘ Annexation of this kind ’ , I said,  ‘ goes by another name in international law —
 conquest ’ . My written report to the United Nations of September 2003 was equally 
strong and declared  ‘ that what we are presently witnessing in the West Bank is a 
visible and clear act of territorial annexation under the guise of security ’ , 16 an accu-
sation that was repeated in my oral report to the Third Committee in October. The 
Third Committee referred the matter to the General Assembly. 
 IV. REQUEST FOR AN OPINION AND PROCEEDINGS 
BEFORE THE COURT 
 Meeting in its Tenth Emergency Special Session, the General Assembly adopted a 
resolution demanding that Israel  ‘ stop and reverse construction of the wall in the 
Occupied Palestinian Territory ’ on the ground that it constituted a departure from 
the Armistice Line of 1949 and was a violation of international law. 17 The resolution 
requested the Secretary-General to report on compliance with the resolution and on 
24 November the Secretary-General reported that Israel had failed to comply. While 
I was in New York to present my report to the Third Committee I suggested to del-
egates that it might be appropriate for the General Assembly to request an advisory 
opinion from the ICJ on the legality of the wall if Israel failed to comply with the 
resolution of the General Assembly. I was later approached by Nasser Al Kidwa, 
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the Palestinian ambassador to the United Nations about the form the question to the 
Court might take. I advised him to formulate any such request to the ICJ along the 
lines of the question posed to the Court in the 1971  Namibia Opinion; that is, 
to stress the legal consequences fl owing from the construction of the wall. On 
8 December 2003 the General Assembly adopted a resolution which welcomed my 
report of 8 September 2003 18 and asked the Court to pronounce on the following 
question: 
 What are the legal consequences arising from the construction of the wall being built by 
Israel, the occupying Power in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including in and around 
East Jerusalem, as described in the report of the Secretary-General, considering the rules 
and principles of international law, including the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949, and 
relevant Security Council and General Assembly resolutions. 19 
 Forty-nine states and regional organisations made written representations to Court 
and 15 addressed the Court in the oral hearings. The United States submitted a 
written representation questioning the propriety of giving an opinion but with no 
comment on the merits. EU member states provided written submissions but did not 
participate in the hearings. Palestine was given permission by the Court to make 
a written statement and to address the Court in the oral hearings. Israel chose to 
ignore the proceedings after submitting a written statement in which it contested 
the jurisdiction of the Court and the propriety of giving an opinion. Although Israel 
chose not to appoint an ad hoc judge, Judge Owada expressed the view that it would 
have been entitled to do so, in which case considerations of fairness might have 
required Palestine to also make such an appointment. 20 Strangely, although the UN 
Secretary-General submitted a written statement to the Court, the Legal Counsel of 
the United Nations did not make oral representations to the Court, despite the fact 
that this had been done in the  Namibia Opinion of 1971. This suggested that the UN 
Secretariat were unhappy about the decision of the General Assembly to ask for an 
Opinion. This was later confi rmed by senior members of the Secretariat in private 
conversations. 
 On 30 June 2004, nine days before the ICJ handed down its Opinion, the Israeli 
Supreme Court, sitting as the High Court of Justice, gave its judgment on a number 
of petitions challenging the construction and routing of the wall. 21 This court held 
that while in many instances the IDF had routed the wall to cause disproportionate 
harm to the Palestinian population, some deviation from the Green Line was per-
missible. In so deciding the Court accepted that the military had acted rationally in 
order to attain the military objective of the wall. 22 
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 V. THE COURT ’ S OPINION 
 A. Jurisdiction 
 The Court had little diffi culty in deciding that it had jurisdiction to give an opinion. 23 
In a unanimous decision it found that the General Assembly was competent to 
request an advisory opinion despite the fact that the question of Israel – Palestine was 
before the Security Council as an attempt to persuade the Council to condemn the 
construction of the wall had been vetoed in October 2003 by a permanent member, the 
United States. 24 This meant that in terms of General Assembly resolution 377 A(V), 
the Uniting for Peace Resolution, the General Assembly was competent to take such 
action. 25 The suggestion that the matter involved a political dispute and not a legal 
question was also rejected. 26 
 B. Propriety 
 Next the Court turned to a number of arguments that had been raised that it would 
be improper for it to give an opinion as this would be inconsistent with the Court ’ s 
judicial function. First, the Court dismissed the argument that it was precluded from 
rendering an opinion because Israel had refused to consent to adjudication, holding 
that the request did not concern a bilateral matter between Israel and Palestine only 
but one of broader concern to the international community. 27 Second, it held that 
the Security Council ’ s decision in Resolution 1515 (2003) of 19 November 2003 
to empower a Quartet, comprising the United Nations, the European Union, the 
 Russian Federation and the United States, to engage in peace-making in the region 
by means of a Roadmap to a Permanent Two-State Solution to the Israeli-Palestinian 
Confl ict was not an obstacle to the rendering of an opinion. 28 Third, the Court 
rejected Israel ’ s argument that the Court did not have suffi cient information before 
it, especially in respect of Israel ’ s security needs, to make a decision. Here the Court 
held that it had been provided with adequate information by the Secretary-General, 
UN special rapporteurs, and parties appearing before the Court. 29 Finally, it dis-
missed the arguments that an opinion would serve no purpose 30 and that Palestine 
had not come to Court with  ‘ clean hands ’ as a result of its violent acts in the course 
of the Second Intifada. 31 By 14 votes to one (Judge Buergenthal of the United States 
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dissenting) the Court found that  ‘ there was no compelling reason ’ for it to use its 
discretionary power not to give an opinion. 32 
 C. Merits 
 The ICJ has often used advisory opinions to consider and clarify legal issues that 
go beyond a narrow answer to the question asked. In so doing, it has contributed 
substantially to the development of the law. The advisory opinions on the  Interna-
tional Status of South West Africa of 1950 33 and  Namibia of 1971 34 are examples 
of such a broad approach to the advisory function. On the other hand, an opinion 
like  Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independ-
ence in Respect of Kosovo 35 confi nes itself to a strict and limited answer to the 
question posed. Although Judge Higgins accuses the Court of not having  ‘ followed 
the tradition of using advisory opinions as an opportunity to elaborate and develop 
international law ’ , 36 the  Wall Opinion does do more than merely answer the ques-
tion before it. In examining the legal norms that render the construction of the wall 
illegal, the Court elaborates on a number of issues that arise in the course of its 
reasoning. Some of these issues are dealt with thoroughly, others abruptly. 37 In the 
result the Opinion falls midway between the approaches adopted in  Namibia and 
 Kosovo. 
 The Court ’ s Opinion is divided into two parts: a consideration of the illegality of 
the wall and the consequences of such illegality. 38 
 The fi rst part commences with an examination of the status of the Occupied 
 Palestinian Territories which traverses the history of the OPT from the adoption of 
the Mandate for Palestine in 1920 to the Oslo Accords of 1993 and the Peace Treaty 
with Jordan of 1994. 39 This brief history falls short of the contextual history of the 
dispute pleaded for by Judge Higgins. 40 The Court then examines the construction, 
route and impact of the wall. In so doing it considers both the present structure of 
the wall and Israel ’ s plans for the future course of the wall. 41 
 After this introduction the Court turns to the applicable law. Here it considers 
norms contained in UN Charter, the General Assembly Declaration on Principles of 
International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States 42 
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of 1970, international humanitarian law contained in the Hague Regulations of 
1907 and Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949, and human rights law set out in the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the International  Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and the Convention on the Rights of 
the Child. 43 
 The Court next considers whether the construction of the wall violates these 
 principles. 44 Here it fi nds that the incorporation of Palestinian land and people into 
the  ‘ seam zone ’ and the inclusion of Jewish illegal settlements in this area severely 
impede the exercise of the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination and 
therefore constitutes a breach of Israel ’ s obligation to respect this right. 45 The Court 
notes Israel ’ s assurance that the wall is only a temporary measure and does not 
amount to annexation but declares that it  ‘ cannot remain indifferent to certain fears 
expressed to it that the route of the wall will prejudge the future frontier between 
Israel and Palestine, and the fear that Israel may integrate the settlements and their 
means of access ’ . 46 However, although it fi nds that the wall and its associated regime 
may create a  fait accompli that could become permanent, and tantamount to annex-
ation, it fails actually to fi nd that the wall constitutes an act of annexation. 47 That 
the Court was reluctant to go so far as to fi nd that the construction of the wall was 
an act of annexation appears from the separate opinion of Judge Elaraby in which he 
declares that the Court should have been more explicit on this subject which should 
have been refl ected in a fi nding on the prohibition of annexation in the  dispositif. 48 
The Court ’ s ambivalent statement suggests that at this stage, so shortly after the start 
of the construction of the wall, it was prepared to give Israel the benefi t of doubt 
about its intentions. 49 
 An examination of international humanitarian law leads the Court to conclude 
that the wall violates Articles 46 and 52 of the Hague Regulations of 1907 and 
Article 53 of the Fourth Geneva Convention requiring private property to be 
respected. Relying on UN reports, including my Special Rapporteur ’ s report of 
8 September 2003, 50 the Court fi nds that the wall results in the seizure of agricul-
tural land and water resources, restrictions on freedom of movement and the right 
to work and denial of access to schools and health services in violation of the inter-
national human rights covenants. These measures violate the right to an adequate 
standard of living and result in internal displacement of the Palestinian people in vio-
lation of Article 49 of the Geneva Convention. 51 Such measures cannot be justifi ed 
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by military necessity or emergency measures. 52 Nor can Israel rely on self-defence 
under Article 51 of the UN Charter or on a state of necessity to preclude the wrong-
fulness of the construction of the wall. 
 The Court concludes by stating that it is not convinced that the  ‘ specifi c course 
Israel has chosen for the wall was necessary to attain its security objectives ’ . 53 
It fi nds that the wall seriously infringes a number of human rights of Palestinians 
living in the OPT and constitutes a breach by Israel of various of its obligations 
under international humanitarian law and human rights law. 54 On this basis it 
rules that Israel is obliged to comply with its obligation to respect the right to 
self-determination of the Palestinian people and its obligations under international 
humanitarian law and human rights law; to cease forthwith construction of the 
wall; and to make reparation for all damage caused by the construction of the wall 
in the OPT. 55 This decision was reached by 14 votes to one with Judge Buergenthal 
again dissenting. 
 Judge Buergenthal ’ s dissent is based largely on the absence of suffi cient evidence 
of Israel ’ s security concerns. He acknowledges that Israel was itself mainly to blame 
for this by its refusal to cooperate with the Court in the provision of evidence but 
reasons that in advisory proceedings, unlike contentious proceedings, there is an 
obligation on the Court to satisfy itself that it has suffi cient evidence on which to base 
an opinion. 56 Unfortunately Judge Buergenthal fails to address the generous fi nding 
of the Court that the construction of the wall did not constitute an act of annexa-
tion which was largely based on respect for Israel ’ s statements, unaccompanied by 
evidence, that the wall was a temporary measure to combat terrorist attacks. 57 
 The Court fi nds that Israel is obliged to comply with its obligation to respect the 
right of the Palestinian people to self-determination and its obligations under inter-
national humanitarian law and international human rights law. 58 The Court also 
holds that Israel is obliged to cease forthwith the construction of the wall and to 
dismantle all sections of the wall in Palestinian territory; 59 to make reparation to all 
property owners whose properties have suffered and to compensate all natural and 
legal persons for any form of material damage incurred as a result of construction 
of the wall. 60 
 The Court fi nds that Israel has violated  erga omnes obligations requiring it to 
respect the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination and certain obliga-
tions under international humanitarian law. This leads it to hold that: 
 All States are under an obligation not to recognize the illegal situation resulting from the 
construction of the wall and not to render aid or assistance in maintaining the situation 
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created by such construction; all States parties to the Fourth Geneva Convention relative 
to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of 12 August 1949 have in addi-
tion the obligation, while respecting the United Nations Charter and international law, 
to ensure compliance by Israel with international humanitarian law as embodied in that 
Convention. 61 
 This decision was taken by 13 votes to two, with Judges Buergenthal and Kooijmans 
dissenting. Judge Kooijmans ’ s principal complaints were that in this case the General 
Assembly had requested an opinion on the legal consequences of an act of a state 
and not, unlike the 1971  Namibia Opinion, an opinion on the legal consequences 
 for States of the conduct of a state; 62 and that the fi nding of a duty not to recognise 
an illegal situation failed to specify what states were expected to do or not to do. 63 
It is diffi cult to follow Judge Kooijmans reasoning. First, the legal consequences 
for  States as a result of a fi nding that the wall was illegal was surely implied in 
the question put to the Court. Second, the duty of non-recognition coupled with 
the obligation not to render aid or assistance in maintaining the situation created by the 
construction of the wall makes it clear that states should desist from any action that 
might be construed as recognition of the wall or any consequences resulting from 
the construction of the wall. 
 Finally, the Court ruled by 14 votes to one (Judge Buergenthal dissenting) that the 
United Nations, and especially the Security Council and General Assembly, should 
consider what further action is required to bring to an end the illegal situation result-
ing from the construction of the wall. 64 
 VI. SIGNIFICANT AND CONTESTED FINDINGS 
 The main focus of the  Wall Opinion and its principal signifi cance, obviously, is the 
fi nding on the illegality of the wall Israel is constructing on Palestinian territory. 
But, in reaching its conclusion, the Court examines a number of other issues, some 
essential for its fi nding and others, perhaps, only tangential to this fi nding. Some of 
these issues raise important questions of law that had been the subject of dispute for 
many years. All have important political consequences. The decision of the Court on 
these issues therefore adds to the signifi cance of the Opinion. 
 A. Self-determination and Independence 
 The right of the Palestinian people to self-determination is today universally recog-
nised. As the Court stressed in the  Wall , even Israel recognises such a right. 65 The 
 Wall Opinion therefore attaches great importance to this right which it describes 
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as a right with an  erga omnes character. 66 All states, the Court declares, are under 
an obligation  ‘ to see to it that any impediment resulting from the construction of 
the wall to the exercise of the Palestinian people of its right to self-determination is 
brought to an end ’ . 67 The importance of this right is echoed by several judges in their 
separate opinions 68 and by Judge Buergenthal in his declaration. 69 
 But does the Court recognise that a necessary consequence of this right is an 
independent Palestinian state ? Yes, say Judges Higgins and Elaraby in their separate 
opinions. According to Judge Higgins  ‘ the Palestinian people are entitled to their ter-
ritory, to exercise self-determination, and to have their own State ’ . 70 Judge Elaraby 
goes further and states that  ‘ the United Nations is under an obligation to pursue the 
establishment of an independent Palestine ’ . 71 
 The judgment of the Court is not so clear. In paragraph 88 of its Opinion the 
Court purports to cite with approval a passage from the 1971 Advisory Opinion on 
 Namibia that in the light of developments in the past 50 years the ultimate objective 
of the sacred trust referred to in Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations 
establishing the mandates system  ‘ was the self-determination and  independence of 
the peoples concerned ’ (italics added). 72 Yet in its citation of this dictum of 1971 in 
the  Wall , the Court omits the word  independence and simply states that the ultimate 
objective of the sacred trust in the mandates system  ‘ was the self-determination  … 
of the peoples concerned ’ . 73 One can only assume that this omission was deliberate. 
But no reason is advanced for this omission. Was it because the Court was too timid 
to commit itself on such a controversial issue ? 
 The statehood and independence of Palestine is disputed in some quarters. 74 The 
United States and Israel vehemently oppose such a notion, and most European States 
follow their lead. But over 130 states today recognise Palestine as an independent 
state and on 29 November 2012 Palestine was recognised an non-member observer 
state by the United Nations General Assembly by a two-thirds majority vote. 75 This 
resolution is generally regarded as recognition of Palestinian statehood, which has 
been confi rmed by Palestine becoming a party to many multilateral treaties, includ-
ing the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. Only the veto of the 
United States stands in the way of its admission to the United Nations. One can only 
speculate whether a bold assertion of Palestine ’ s right to an independent state as a 
component of the right to self-determination in the  Wall would have had any impact 
on Palestine ’ s claim to statehood. 
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 B. Fourth Geneva Convention 
 Israel became a party to the 1949 Fourth Geneva Convention Relative to the Pro-
tection of Civilian Persons in Time of War in 1951. Following its occupation of 
the Palestinian territories occupied by Jordan and Egypt in 1967, Israel refused to 
acknowledge the applicability of the Convention to these territories, preferring to 
view them as  ‘ liberated ’ ,  ‘ disputed ’ or  ‘ administered ’ territories to which, as a mat-
ter of policy but not law, it was prepared to extend the humanitarian provisions 
of the Convention. 76 Although the political aspirations of those who yearn for a 
Greater Israel were largely responsible for this decision, there is no doubt that Israel 
was unwilling to commit itself to the obligation contained in Article 49(6) of the 
Convention to refrain from transferring part of its civilian population into the 
 Palestinian territories. The political decision not to apply the Convention is backed 
by sophisticated legal argument. The principal argument maintains that Article 2(2) 
of the Fourth Geneva Convention applies the Convention only to cases of  ‘ occupa-
tion of the territory of a High Contracting Party ’ and that the Palestinian territories 
were, prior to 1967, under the occupation of Jordan and Egypt and were conse-
quently not the territory of a High Contracting Party. There was no sovereign power 
in the Palestinian territories to which the territory might be returned on the conclu-
sion of a peace treaty. 77 A secondary argument, advanced by Stephen Schwebel, 
later to become President of the ICJ, was that the territories had been acquired in 
self-defence in the Six-Day War which meant that Israel ’ s title was better than that 
of Jordan or Egypt which had occupied the territories unlawfully as aggressors in 
1948. This gave Israel title by  ‘ defensive conquest ’ , 78 which could not be character-
ised as belligerent occupation. The Supreme Court of Israel carefully refrained from 
pronouncing on the applicability of the Fourth Geneva Convention. 79 
 The Court dismissed the fi rst of Israel ’ s arguments after an examination of the 
Fourth Geneva Convention and the practice of states and international organisa-
tions. It emphasised that Article 2(1) of the Convention made it clear that all that 
was required to make the Convention applicable was the existence of an armed 
confl ict between two or more of the contracting parties. (Israel, Jordan, and Egypt 
were all contracting parties.) In such a case the Convention applied in any terri-
tory occupied in the course of the confl ict by one of the parties. The purpose of 
Article 2(2) was not to exclude from the scope of application of the Convention 
territories not falling under the sovereignty of one of the parties. Rather, the inten-
tion of the drafters of the Convention, said the Court, was  ‘ to protect civilians who 
fi nd themselves, in whatever way, in the hands of the occupying Power ’ regardless 
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of the status of the occupied territories. 80 This interpretation was confi rmed by the 
 travaux pr é paratoires of the Convention and had subsequently been confi rmed by 
states parties to the Convention, the International Committee of the Red Cross, 
the General Assembly and the Security Council. 81 The Court concluded that  ‘ the 
Fourth Geneva Convention is applicable in any occupied territory in the event of an 
armed confl ict arising between two or more High Contracting Parties ’ . 82 As Israel, 
Jordan, and Egypt were all contracting parties it followed that the Convention is 
applicable to the occupied territories to the east of the Green Line. 83 The fi nding 
of the Court on the applicability of the Fourth Geneva Convention in the OPT was 
unanimous. 84 
 Israel ’ s second argument based on  ‘ defensive conquest ’ was not considered. 85 
To do so would have required the Court to examine the history of the Palestinian 
territories between 1948 and 1967, which it had refrained from doing, much to the 
annoyance of Judge Kooijmans. 86 Was this a deliberate omission to avoid comment-
ing on the reprehensible conduct of Jordan, which had tried unsuccessfully to annex 
the West Bank and East Jerusalem ? Or did it wish to avoid challenging the view of a 
former colleague, Judge Schwebel, despite the fact that it was patently wrong. First, 
because his argument assumed that Israel acted in self-defence in 1967 in the face 
of much evidence to the contrary. 87 Second, because it failed to acknowledge that 
title to territory may not be acquired by the use of force, whether used defensively 
or aggressively. 
 C. Settlements 
 Article 49(6) of the Fourth Geneva Convention prohibits an occupying power from 
transferring parts of its own civilian population into territory it occupies. According 
to the  Commentary of the International Committee of the Red Cross this clause was 
intended to prevent a practice adopted by some states during the Second World War 
of transferring their own population into occupied territory  ‘ to colonize those ter-
ritories ’ . Such transfers, said the  Commentary ,  ‘ worsened the economic situation of 
the native population and endangered their separate existence as a race ’ . 88 
 That Article 49(6) prohibits Israel from establishing settlements in the Palestinian 
Occupied Territories and from colonising such territories is accepted by the United 
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Nations, the International Committee of the Red Cross and states (including the 
United States). 
 Only Israel disputes the illegality of Jewish settlement in the OPT. 
 Initially Israel claimed that it had established settlements in order to defend its 
occupation of the OPT. 89 This pretext has, however, long been abandoned. Today 
settlements range in nature from small hilltop outposts to large cities with 
 populations of many thousands, serving the needs of Zionists determined to occupy 
what they regard as Greater Israel — Eretz Israel — and ordinary civilians who treat 
 settlements as towns and cities for suburban living, replete with schools, university, 
 hospitals, supermarkets, sports grounds and parks. No longer able to justify settle-
ments as a security measure, Israel has argued that it is not bound by the Fourth 
Geneva Convention and that, even if it were, these settlements are not prohibited by 
Article 49(6) as the inhabitants have moved voluntarily to the settlements and not 
been transferred by the government of Israel. 90 The Israel Supreme Court has studi-
ously refrained from pronouncing on the legality of settlements. 91 
 The ICJ had no diffi culty in fi nding — unanimously 92 — that settlements in the OPT 
(including East Jerusalem) are illegal. In support of this fi nding it invokes repeated 
resolutions of the Security Council. 93 
 D. Human Rights Conventions 
 The applicability of the Fourth Geneva Convention and a number of multilateral 
human rights conventions in the OPT is fundamental to the Court ’ s Opinion, as 
the fi nding on the illegality of the wall is based on the violation of these conven-
tions. Although Israel is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and 
the Convention on the Rights of the Child, it maintains, fi rst, that these covenants 
do not have extraterritorial application to the OPT, and, second, that international 
humanitarian law is  lex specialis governing the situation in the OPT to the exclusion 
of human rights conventions. 94 
 Relying on its Advisory Opinion on the  Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear 
Weapons , 95 the Court fi nds, unanimously, 96 that the three human rights conven-
tions in question have extraterritorial application and do not cease in time of armed 
confl ict, in which case they apply together with international humanitarian law. 
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The practice of the monitoring committees of the two International Covenants con-
fi rms this conclusion. 97 
 E. Prolonged Occupation 
 International humanitarian law contemplates that a state of occupation will be of 
short duration. However, in 2004 the occupation of the Palestinian territories was 
already in its thirty-seventh year. In 2002 the Israeli Government had claimed that 
the prolonged nature of the occupation had resulted in fewer [or: less onerous] 
legal obligations for it as occupying power. In response, in my Special Rapporteur ’ s 
report of that year, I had refuted this claim, arguing that the full protection of 
the Fourth Geneva Convention was still required. 98 The implications of the pro-
longed occupation were not raised in the proceedings before the Court in the  Wall 
case. Consequently, the Court ’ s strange pronouncement on this subject came as a 
surprise. 
 Article 6(3) of the Fourth Geneva Convention provides that: 
 In the case of an occupied territory, the application of the present Convention shall cease 
one year after the general close of military operations; however, the Occupying Power shall 
be bound, for the duration of the occupation, to the extent that such Power exercises the 
functions of government in such territory, by the provisions of the following Articles of the 
present Convention: 1 to 12, 27, 29 to 34, 47, 49, 51, 53, 59, 61 to 77, 143. 
 In paragraph 125 of its Opinion the Court interpreted Article 6 to mean that all the 
provisions of the Convention remain in force  ‘ during military operations  leading to 
occupation ’ (italics added), whereas only the specifi ed provisions of the Convention 
remain in force a year after this event. Such an interpretation, which introduces a 
qualifi cation on military operations (see the italicised phrase above) not found in 
the Convention itself seriously  ‘ reduces the scope of the protection that the popu-
lation enjoys under the Convention ’ . 99 Inter alia, it precludes the operation of the 
enforcement provisions of the Convention contained in Articles 146 and 147. This 
interpretation takes no account of the fact that  ‘ because of the sheer length of the 
occupation and the continued confl ict in the region, countless military operations 
have taken place in the OPT, only one of which can actually be said to have led to the 
occupation of that territory (1967) ’ . 100 In the words of Professor Yoram Dinstein, 
it is a  ‘ bewildering statement ’ as it  ‘ suggests that the clock of the one-year rule of 
Article 6 (third paragraph) started ticking as soon as the Israeli occupation began, 
in June 1967 ’ . 101 
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 F. Self-Defence 
 Undoubtedly the most controversial part of the Court ’ s Opinion is that dealing with 
self-defence. In a terse, unreasoned dictum, the Court dismissed Israel ’ s argument 
that the construction of the wall was justifi ed as self-defence under Article 51 of the 
UN Charter. First, the Court held that Article 51 recognises the inherent right of self-
defence only  ‘ in the case of an armed attack by one State against another State ’ and 
Israel  ‘ does not claim that the attacks against it are imputable to a foreign State ’ . 102 
Second, the Court held that because Israel exercises control over the OPT and the 
threat which it regarded as justifying construction of the wall originated from within 
that territory, the situation was different from that contemplated by Security Council 
resolutions 1368 (2001) and 1373 (2001) which Israel had invoked to support its 
argument of self-defence. 
 Neither of the reasons provided by the Court for rejecting Israel ’ s argument is 
convincing. The fi rst is incorrect. As pointed out by Judges Higgins, 103 Kooijmans 104 
and Buergenthal, 105 and by academic critics, 106 Article 51 does not restrict the right 
of self-defence to attacks on a state by another state. The second reason hints at the 
correct reason but is side-tracked into drawing an unsatisfactory distinction between 
the situation in the OPT and that contemplated by Security Council resolutions 1368 
and 1373. Resolutions 1368 and 1373, which were adopted in the wake of the 
attack on the World Trade Center on 11 September 2001, do not deal with an armed 
attack on the United States by another state. Instead they recognise the right of a 
state to respond in self-defence to acts of international terrorism without any sug-
gestion that there need be an armed attack by a state. They are concerned with acts 
of international terrorism that constitute a threat to international peace and security. 
According to Judge Kooijmans,  ‘ they therefore have no immediate bearing on terror-
ist acts originating within a territory which is under control of the State which is also 
the victim of these acts ’ . 107 This is the explanation for the Court ’ s statement that the 
situation before the Court is different from that contemplated by resolutions 1368 
and 1373 and why Israel may not invoke Article 51. 
 The real reason that resolutions 1368 and 1373 do not apply, unfortunately not 
mentioned by the Court, is that Israel is essentially engaged in a policing operation 
as occupying power of the OPT. Israel is not the victim of an armed attack that 
allows it to invoke Article 51 and the sympathy of the world. It is an occupying 
power that is building a wall to maintain its occupation. This is made clear by the 
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Supreme Court of Israel in its two major decisions on the legality of the wall — Beit 
Sourik Council v Government of Israel 108 and  Mara ’ abe v the Prime Minister of 
Israel . 109 Both these decisions hold that international humanitarian law allows Israel 
to construct a security wall to protect its army and settlers as part of its duty as occu-
pying power to maintain order in the occupied territory. 110 Moreover, both decisions 
acknowledge that the legality of the wall and its route are to be judged by the rules 
of international humanitarian law, as found by the ICJ. 111 
 There is a reluctance on the part of states to treat the occupation of Palestine as 
an occupation similar to other occupations in history. 112 Had Germany built a wall 
between itself and France in response to the  ‘ terrorist activities ’ of the French resist-
ance, it is unlikely that Germany would have justifi ed its action as an act taken in 
self-defence. It would rather have seen such a wall as part of its actions to maintain 
control over an occupied territory whose citizens had resisted the occupation by 
violent means. 
 VII. AFTERMATH 
 The  Wall Opinion was handed down on 9 July 2004. On 20 July the General 
Assembly adopted resolution ES-10/15 by 150 votes to six with 10 abstentions. 
Member states of the European Union and the Russian Federation voted in favour 
of the resolution while Israel and the United States voted against. The resolution 
 ‘ acknowledged ’ the Opinion,  ‘ demanded ’ that Israel  ‘ comply with its obligations 
as mentioned in the advisory opinion ’ , called upon member states to  ‘ comply with 
their obligations as mentioned in the advisory opinion ’ and requested the Secretary-
General  ‘ to establish a register of damages caused to all natural or legal persons ’ by 
the construction of the wall. Since then both the General Assembly and the Human 
Rights Council have regularly passed resolutions approving the Opinion and calling 
for its implementation. 
 The Security Council has neither acknowledged nor approved the Opinion. Since 
November 2003, 113 when it endorsed the creation of the Quartet, comprising the 
United Nations, the European Union, the Russian Federation and the United States, 
to pursue a solution to the confl ict in the Middle East premised on a Roadmap for 
peace, the Security Council has largely left the confl ict between Israel and Palestine 
to this Quartet. 114 The Quartet issues regular press statements, addressed to the 
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 President of the Council about its concerns relating to events in the Middle East. It 
has only once mentioned the  Wall Opinion and not suggested that it might be a useful 
guide to peace in the region. 115 This is due to the pivotal role in the Quartet played 
by the United States, which has made it clear from the outset that it was opposed to 
the Opinion and would ensure that it was not implemented. 116 The member states 
of the European Union, the Russian Federation and the United Nations have all 
expressed support for the Opinion in some way but they are powerless to persuade 
the Quartet to approve or to implement the Opinion. 
 An advisory opinion is by defi nition advisory. Clearly the opinion itself is not 
binding on states. 117 On the other hand, states are bound by the Fourth Geneva 
Convention, the Hague Regulations of 1907, the International Covenants and 
customary international law upon which the Opinion is based. While not bound 
by the Opinion itself, states, including Israel and the United States, are nonetheless 
bound by the obligations upon which it relies. The Opinion has simply elucidated 
and confi rmed these obligations. It is not therefore correct to describe the Opinion 
as  ‘ merely advisory ’ as far as sates are concerned. 
 Predictably, the Israeli government rejected the Opinion. This was followed by 
a decision of the Israeli Supreme Court in  Mara ’ abe v Prime Minister 118 which 
ruled that the construction of the wall within Palestinian territory was justifi ed 
as a security measure to protect both Israel itself and the safety of Jewish settlers. 
The Court held that the ICJ ’ s opinion was fl awed by reason of its failure to have 
access to the full facts surrounding the wall and accepted without serious examina-
tion the assurances of the Israeli military that the wall was constructed for security 
purposes. 119 My view that the wall also served a political purpose, namely to seize 
land and to incorporate settlements into Israel, was expressly rejected. 120 The court 
accepted that settlers were entitled to protection but refused to consider the legality 
of settlements! 121 
 States in the main have not complied with the obligations found by the Court to 
be binding on them in the  Wall Opinion. Most recognise the illegality of the wall; 
but, under the infl uence of the United States, accept that Israel will be allowed to 
retain Palestinian land incorporated by the wall that accommodates Israeli settle-
ments in any future peace agreement. In these circumstances it is hard to say that 
states have refused  ‘ to recognize the illegal situation resulting from the construc-
tion of the wall ’ or that they have not rendered assistance in maintaining the illegal 
situation created by the wall — as required by the Court. 122 Moreover, states parties 
to the Fourth Geneva Convention have not put pressure on Israel to comply with 
the provisions of humanitarian law embodied in that Convention. On the contrary, 
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Israel persists in its argument that it is not bound by the Fourth Geneva  Convention 
and no meaningful steps have been taken by state parties to ensure compliance. 
At the same time Israel continues to maintain that human rights conventions do not 
apply in the OPT. 
 Much has been written about the legal consequences for states of advisory opinions 
in the light of the fact that only judgments in contentious proceedings are designated 
as binding by Article 59 of the Court ’ s Statute, and enforceable in terms of Article 94 
of the Charter. On the other hand, Shabtai Rosenne maintains that the  ‘ practical 
difference ’ between the two is  ‘ not signifi cant ’ as both depend on the  auctoritas of 
the same court. 123 If there is little  ‘ practical difference ’ between the consequence of 
judgments in contentious proceedings and advisory opinions for  States there should 
be no difference at all as far as the consequences for the  United Nations are con-
cerned. After all, the ICJ is the judicial arm of the United Nations and it would seem 
that the organisation must be bound by an advisory opinion requested by one of its 
own organs and approved by that organ. In the words of Sir Hersch Lauterpacht, an 
opinion requested and approved by the General Assembly is  ‘ the law recognized by 
the United Nations ’ . 124 Despite this the Secretary-General and the Secretariat of the 
United Nations have done little to ensure compliance with the  Wall Opinion. 
 That the Secretariat was unenthusiastic about the request for the  Wall Opinion 
was confi rmed in private meetings I held with senior members of the Secretariat 
in my capacity as Special Rapporteur. This is refl ected in the failure of successive 
Secretaries-General to express any support for the Opinion in the statements issued 
by the Quartet. They have simply acquiesced in the determination of the United 
States to kill the Opinion. Further evidence of this lack of enthusiasm is provided 
by the delay in the establishment of the offi ce to handle the Register of Damages 
mandated by the General Assembly in resolution ES-10/15 of 20 July 2004 and the 
failure to authorise this body to secure compensation for those who have suffered 
damage as a consequence of the construction of the wall. 
 The Secretary-General has been encouraged to do nothing by his legal offi ce. 
On 10 August 2004 Ralph Zacklin of the Offi ce of the UN Legal Adviser gave an 
opinion to Kieran Prendergast, Under Secretary-General for Political Affairs, which 
declares that Secretary-General need not take action on the Opinion because the 
Secretariat  ‘ is not a direct addressee of any of the legal consequences determined by 
the Court to arise from the construction of the wall ’ 125 and  ‘ the Advisory Opinion 
itself is not binding ’ . Whether the Secretary-General should take action to imple-
ment the Opinion was a political decision which  ‘ was legally  … not called for ’ . 126 
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 Israel, states and the United Nations have not heeded the call of the ICJ for respect 
for humanitarian law and human rights law in the OPT. This has allowed Israel to 
proceed with the construction of the wall and the expansion of settlements. In 2004 
the length of the wall was 180 kilometres. 127 Today it is over 500 kilometres long. In 
2004 the settlement population numbered some 400,000. 128 Today there are almost 
8,000 Jewish settlers in the West Bank and East Jerusalem: 400,000 in the West Bank 
and over 300,000 in East Jerusalem. (Israel withdrew its settlements from Gaza in 
2005.) The settlement of Beitar Illit has grown to become a city with a population of 
45,0000, while Ariel has a population of 18,000. Fifty-six settlements, accommodat-
ing nearly 80 per cent of the settler population, are in the  ‘ seam zone ’ between the 
Green Line and the wall. Not only has the United States blocked compliance with the 
 Wall Opinion; it has also prevented action from being taken to curb the expansion of 
settlements: in February 2011 it vetoed a proposal to condemn the construction of 
settlements in the OPT. On 23 December 2016, however, the United States abstained 
from voting on Security Council Resolution 2334 condemning settlements. 
 The colonisation of the West Bank and East Jerusalem continues unabated and 
increasingly it is argued that Israel ’ s settlement enterprise has resulted in a system 
akin to that of apartheid in which a discriminatory legal order favours settlers above 
Palestinians. 129 
 That the wall will annex Palestinian land taken by the wall is no longer seri-
ously contested. The United States, the principal  ‘ peace broker ’ , accepts that the 
wall will in large part become the future border between Israel and Palestine and 
has given assurances to Israel that it will be allowed to keep settlements encircled 
by the wall. 130 Israeli politicians now openly assert that a future border will follow 
the route of the wall. The claim that the wall is designed to serve as a security wall 
has become secondary. In 2005 the Minister of Justice, Tzipi Livni, declared that the 
wall would serve as  ‘ the future border of the state of Israel ’ . 131 This prompted the 
Israeli High Court to express concerns that it had been misled by the government on 
the purpose the wall was intended to serve. 132 
 The wall has become a  fait accompli . The opposition of the United States to the 
 Wall Opinion, the failure of the Quartet to make any attempt to secure compliance 
with the Opinion, the readiness of European states to fall in line with the United 
States on this issue, and the reservations of the Secretariat of the United Nations 
mean that the wall has ceased to be a matter of contention between the international 
community of States and Israel. If world politics is defi ned in terms of relations 
between states and the actions of international institutions, the  Wall has been a 
political failure. The manner in which states and the United Nations have ignored 
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the Opinion has undoubtedly affected the credibility of the Court. This does not 
appear to trouble those states which most strongly express respect for the Rule of 
Law in international affairs. 
 Any peaceful settlement of the seemingly intractable dispute between Israel and 
Palestine will have to be guided by international law. The  Wall Opinion provides a 
normative framework for such a resolution of the confl ict. This is realised by civil 
society which has invoked the Opinion as its lodestar for action towards the just set-
tlement of the confl ict.  BDS — boycott, divestment, and sanctions — a civil society ini-
tiative to boycott Israel along the same lines as apartheid South Africa, was started 
on 9 July 2005, exactly one year after the  Wall Opinion was handed down, invoking 
the Opinion as a justifi cation for its action. Other civil society action is also premised 
on the Opinion. The decision of the European Union to require goods produced on 
settlements in the West Bank to be labelled as coming from the West Bank and not 
Israel 133 is based on the illegality of settlements confi rmed by the ICJ in the  Wall. In 
the short term the  Wall Opinion may have been a failure. The long-term implications 
of the Opinion are probably still to be felt. 
 
 

